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Tax Policy and the Virtuous Sovereign: 
Dworkinian Equality and Redistributive Taxation 
 
David G. Duff* 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Among the purposes of a tax system, it is generally accepted that one role is 
to implement a society’s conception of distributive justice.1 Indeed, if justice is, as 
John Rawls famously declared, “the first virtue of social institutions,” 2 it follows that 
the specification of tax policies to implement this conception of distributive justice 
is both ethically and logically prior to the determination of tax policies that are 
designed to fulfill other objectives of a tax system such as financing public goods and 
services and the regulation of market failures.3 For this reason, distributive justice 
may properly be regarded as the first or sovereign virtue of a society’s tax system – 
to which a virtuous sovereign should properly attend. 
 
In practice, however, there are various conceptions of distributive justice, 
with different implications for the design of a society’s tax system. Classica l 
utilitarianism, for example, which underlies much of the economic analysis that 
dominates tax policy analysis, conceptualizes justice as the maximization of 
aggregate welfare, and supports tax and spending policies that weigh the utility 
gains from redistributive transfers against the utility losses attributable to the 
imposition of different taxes.4 Based on these precepts, contemporary welfarist 
approaches to tax policy have generally favoured proportionate or declining-rate 
                                                 
* Professor and Director Tax LL.M. Program, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British 
Columbia 
1 See, e.g. Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership; Taxes and Justice, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 3. Although Murphy and Nagel’s book may be the most prominent  
articulation of this position in recent years, it can be found in Adolph Wagner’s 1883 “Three Extracts 
on Public Finance” and is reflected in traditional public finance scholarship which distinguishes 
between a government’s allocative and distributive functions.  See Adolf Wagner, “Three Extracts on 
Public Finance” in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, 
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964) 1-15 at 12-15; and Richard A. Musgrave, Peggy B. Musgrave, 
and Richard M. Bird, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 1st Cdn. Ed. (Toronto: ON: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1987) at 5-12. See also Reuven Avi-Yonah, “The Three Goals of Taxation” (2006), 60 Tax 
Law Rev. 1-28. 
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 3. 
3 If justice is the first virtue of social insti tutions, the ethical priority of distributive justice in the 
design of a society’s tax system is tautological. Logical priority turns on the fact that social choices 
regarding public goods and services and appropriate regul ation are likely to differ according to the 
distribution of economic resources. 
4 See, e.g., James A. Mirrlees, “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation” (1971), 38 
Rev. of Econ. Studies 175-208. 
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income taxes combined with redistributive transfer payments,5 or the taxation of 
personal consumption at progressive rates.6 
 
In contrast to classical utilitarianism, which he explicitly rejects,7 Rawls 
presents a liberal-egalitarian conception of justice, according to which each person 
is accorded “an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for others” (the first principle of justice),8 and social and economic 
inequalities are permitted only to the extent that they work to everyone’s advantag e 
(the difference principle)9 and are attached to positions and offices that are 
reasonably accessible to all (the principle of fair equality of opportunity).10 On this 
basis, he recommends progressive gift and inheritance taxes “to gradually and 
continually … correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of 
power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity,”11 and a proportional expenditure tax (a flat-rate tax on personal 
consumption) to raise revenues so that “the government … can provide for … public 
goods and make the transfer payments necessary to satisfy the difference 
principle.”12 
 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, “Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look 
at Progressive Taxation” (1987), 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1905-67. 
6 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, “Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax” (2004) , 
103 Tax Notes  91-113; and Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, “The Superiority of an Ideal 
Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax” (2006), 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413-1456. 
7 Rawls, supra note 2 at 26-27. 
8 Ibid. at 60. Rawls defines these basic liberties (at p. 61) as “roughly speaking, political liberty, (the 
right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; 
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold 
(personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest or seizure as defined by the concept of the 
rule of law.” 
9 Ibid. at 61. Although the difference principle is more generally understood as requiring (as Rawls 
subsequently emphasizes at p. 75) that inequalities “improve the expectations of the least 
advantaged members of society,” this more limited formulation is implied by the more general 
requirement that inequalities must be (as an economist would say) Pareto efficient. 
10 Ibid. at 73: “The thought here is that positions are to be not only open in a formal sense, but that all 
should have a fair chance to attain them.” Rawls further expl ains (at p. 73) that this principle does 
not disregard abilities and efforts, but rather implies that “those who are at the same level of talent 
and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success 
regardless of their ini tial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which 
they are born.” 
11 Ibid. at 277, adding (at p. 277) that “the progressive principle might be applied at the beneficiary’s 
end” in order to “encourage the wide dispersal of property which is a necessary condition, it seems, if 
the fair value of the equal liberties is to be maintained.” 
12 Ibid. at 278. For Rawls, a proportional annual consumption tax along these lines is “preferable to an 
income tax … at the l evel of common sense precepts of justice, since i t imposes a levy according to 
how much a person takes out of the common store of goods and not according to how much he 
contributes (assuming here that income is fairly earned).” In addition, he suggests (at p. 279), “[i]t 
may be better … to use progressive rates only when they are necessary to preserve the justice of the 
basic structure with respect to the first principle of justice and fair equality of opportunity, and so to 
forestall accumul ations of property likely to undermine the corresponding institutions” – adding that 
this approach “might help signal an important distinction in questions of policy.”  
 3 
Classical libertarian theories of justice, on the other hand, criticize utilitarian 
and Rawlsian conceptions of distributive justice on the grounds that these 
“patterned” or “end-result” approaches violate people’s rights to the ownership of 
property that is justly acquired and justly transferred.13 From this perspective, 
Robert Nozick maintains, all redistributive taxes and transfers are objectionable,14 
except to the extent that they correct for past injustices in the acquisition or transfer 
of property.15 As a result, most libertarians would limit taxation to the collection of 
revenues necessary to support a minimal state dedicated to the protection of 
persons and property,16 and allocate tax burdens according to the benefits that 
taxpayers receive.17 In practice, these libertarian theories appear to be compatible 
with all major tax bases, including income, consumption and wealth,18 though most 
libertarian approaches to tax policy conclude that whatever tax is adopted should be 
levied at a flat or proportional rate.19 
 
Like Nozick, Ronald Dworkin also rejects patterned or end state conceptions 
of distributive justice – which he criticizes as “ethically insensitive” in that they 
“deploy standards of just distribution that … do not reflect the distinctions and 
assignments of responsibility we make in leading our lives.”20 In opposition to 
classical libertarianism, however, Dworkin regards a conception of equality as 
central to a theory of distributive justice, insisting that “[n]o government is 
legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over 
whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance.” 21 Drawing on each of 
these principles, Dworkin proposes a theory of distributive justice as “equality of 
resources” that aims to provide “a unified account of equality and individual 
responsibility that respects both.”22 
                                                 
13 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974) at 149-231. 
14 Ibid. at 168, arguing that “redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving, as it does, the 
violation of people’s rights.” See also Richard A. Epstein, “Taxation in a Lockean Worl d” (1986), 4 Soc. 
Phil. & Pol’y 49 at 68, emphasizing that “within the Lockean world, the redistribution of income 
through the tax system is an unacceptable function of government.” 
15 Nozick at 230-31 (discussing the possibility of redistributive transfers in order to rectify past 
injustices). 
16 Nozick at ix, arguing that only “a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection 
against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive 
state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified .” 
17 See, e.g., Eric Mack, “Self-Ownership, Taxation, and Democracy: A Philosophical-Constitutional 
Perspective,” in Donald P. Racheter and Richard E. Wagner, Politics, Taxation and the Rule of Law: The 
Power to Tax in Constitutional Perspective, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) 9 at 29, n. 11, 
arguing that “no individual [should] be made to contribute out of proportion to the benefits to him of 
the protective services.” 
18 See the discussion in David G. Duff, “Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libe rtarian World: A 
Critical Review” (2005), 18:1 Can. J. Law & Juris. 23-45 at 32-34. 
19 See ibid. at 34-36. 
20 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality , (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000) at 323-24. 
21 Ibid. at 1. 
22 Ibid. at 7. In this respect, Dworkin notes, his approach contradicts the “value pluralism” of Isaiah 
Berlin, who “insisted that important political values are in dramatic conflict” and “particularly 
emphasized the conflict between liberty and equality.” Ibid. at 5.  More a detailed expl anation, see 
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This article explains Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources and its 
implications for redistributive taxation, arguing that it provides a persuasive 
argument for progressive income and wealth transfer taxes as essential elements of 
a just tax system. Part II examines the theory itself in contrast to other prominent 
theories of distributive justice, concluding that Dworkin’s approach provides a more 
compelling conception of distributive justice than welfare-based theories that do 
not take rights and responsibilities seriously, Rawlsian theory which is insufficiently 
attentive to individual rights and responsibilities, and classical libertarianism which 
fails to take equality seriously. Part III considers the implications of Dworkin’s 
theory for redistributive taxation, addressing both the kinds of taxes that a virtuous 
sovereign should collect for this purpose and key features in the design of these 
taxes. Part IV concludes. 
 
II.  Theory 
 
In order to understand Dworkin’s idea of equality of resources, it is perhaps 
best to contrast this theory of distributive justice with other prominent theories that 
he explicitly rejects. The theory’s emphasis on “resources” as a standard for 
measuring equality, for example, represents a marked departure from theories 
based on utility or welfare, which Dworkin subjects to detailed criticism.23 At the 
same time, the theory’s reliance on a concept of “ethical individualism” that 
evaluates the justice of distributive outcomes based on the distinction between 
people’s choices and their circumstances differs significantly from the political 
liberalism of John Rawls. 24  Finally, the analytical devices and institutional 
arrangements on which Dworkin’s theory relies in order to achieve “equality” in the 
distribution of resources are fundamentally opposed to those that underlie 
libertarian conceptions of private property.25 
 
The following sections outline Dworkin’s concept of equality of resources in 
contrast to other theories of distributive justice: (1) reviewing Dworkin’s critique of 
welfare as a measure of distributive equality, (2) explaining Dworkin’s concept of 
resources and the idea of ethical individualism that distinguishes Dworkin’s theory 
from that of John Rawls; and (3) contrasting the procedural and institutional devices 
on which Dworkin’s theory relies in order to ensure equality in the distribution of 
resources from the procedural and institutional arrangements contemplated in 
classical libertarianism. In each case, I conclude, Dworkin’s theory offers a more 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arthur Ripstein, “Liberty and Equality” in Arthur Ripstein, ed., Ronald Dworkin, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 82-108. 
23 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20, chapter 1 (“Equality of Welfare). 
24 Ibid. at 5, explaining that “Rawls’ social-contract device is designed to insulate political morality 
from ethical assumptions and controversies about the character of a good life” whereas equality of 
resources appeals to “more general ethical values” such as “the structure of a good life” and 
“principles of personal responsibility.” 
25 Ibid., chapter 2 (“Equality of Resources”). 
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compelling account of distributive justice than the alternative theories that he 
rejects. 
 
A.  What’s Wrong with Welfare? 
 
 Beginning with welfare, it is useful to begin by recalling Rawls’ objections to 
classical utilitarianism – that it does not automatically exclude offensive or 
illegitimate preferences, 26 does not necessarily guarantee the protection of rights 
and liberties which are contingent on their utility at a particular time and place,27 
does not concern itself, except indirectly, with how welfare is distributed,28 and 
“does not take seriously the distinction between persons .”29 Extending this critique 
of aggregate welfare as a criterion of distributive justice, Dworkin rejects welfare as 
a standard for measuring distributional equality, arguing that the concept of 
“resources” constitutes a better measure for this purpose. 
 
 In order to make this argument, Dworkin begins by acknowledging the initial 
appeal of welfare as a criterion for distributive justice – noting that the concept of 
welfare was devised “precisely to describe what is fundamental in life rather than 
what is merely instrumental” whereas “resources are valuable so far as they 
produce welfare.”30 As a result, he observes: 
 
The basic, immediate appeal of equality of welfare … lies in the idea that 
welfare is what really matters to people, as distinct from money and goods, 
which matter to them only instrumentally, so far as these are useful in 
producing welfare. Equality of welfare proposes, that is, to make people equal 
in what is fundamentally important to them.31 
 
Notwithstanding this initial appeal, however, Dworkin makes three arguments 
against welfare as a suitable metric for equality. 
 
                                                 
26 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 30-31, noting that discriminatory preferences are not 
automatically excluded from utilitarian calculation, even if they are generally denied or suppressed 
“because they tend to be socially destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways.”  
27 Ibid. at 26, expl aining that “there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should not 
compensate for the lesser losses of others ; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a 
few might not be made right by the greater good shares by the many. It simply happens that under 
most conditions, at least in a reasonably advanced stage of civilization, the greatest sum of 
advantages is not attained in this way.” 
28 Ibid. To the extent that marginal utility diminishes, classical utilitarianism may favour equality in 
the distribution of resources, though the welfare gain from any redistribution must be weighed 
against the welfare losses resul ting from disincentives to production and the cost of redistribution 
itself. Importantly, however, equality is not an end in itself, but a (potential) product of utilitarian 
calculation.   
29 Ibid. at 27, explaining that the utilitarian conception of an “impartial spectator” who aggregates 
utilities across different persons effectively conflates all persons into one.  
30 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 14. 
31 Ibid. at 31. 
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 First, he explains, to the extent that the concept of welfare does not exclude 
political and impersonal preferences, a concept of distributive justice premised on 
equality of welfare implies that individuals should be compensated for all such 
preferences that are not realized – even if these preferences are offensive or 
unreasonable, such as those attributable to racial prejudice or unrealistic 
aspirations about some desired state of the world.32 In contrast, Dworkin argues, in 
a society that is committed to distributional equality, the conception of equality that 
is adopted would presumably exclude the satisfaction of offensive and unreasonable 
political and impersonal preferences – thereby precluding any compensation for 
unrealized preferences of this sort. 33  More importantly, he adds, since an 
unrestricted conception of welfare cannot account for this result, it is necessary to 
rely on some independent theory of distributive justice for this purpose.34 
 
 Second, he continues, even if the concept of welfare is limited to purely 
personal preferences, equality of welfare would require a society to allocate 
relatively more resources to individuals with expensive tastes that are costly to 
satisfy and expansive goals that are difficult to realize, than to other individuals with 
more modest tastes and limited ambitions – even if these expensive tastes and 
expansive goals are deliberately cultivated.35 These “troubling counterexamples”, 
Dworkin argues, “are embarrassing for the theory that equality means equality of 
welfare precisely because we believe that equality … condemns rather than 
recommends compensating for deliberately cultivated expensive tastes.”36 
                                                 
32 Ibid. at 21-28. 
33 See, e.g., ibid. at 23, referring to offensive political preferences: “a good society is one that treats the 
conception of equality that society endorses, not simply as a preference some people might have, and 
therefor as a source of fulfilment others might be denied who should then be compensated in other 
ways, but as a matter of justice that should be accepted by everyone because it is right. Such a society 
will not compensate people for having preferences that its fundamental political  institutions declare 
it is wrong for them to have.” 
34 Ibid. at 25 (characterizing success-based conceptions of equality of welfare that admit “sound” 
political preferences as “an empty ideal, useful only when it rubber -stamps a distribution already and 
independently shown to be just through some more restricted conception of equality of success or 
through some other political ideal altogether”); and 27 (observing that “we … need an independent 
theory about when an impersonal preference is reasonable or when i t is reasonable to compensate 
for one”). 
35 Ibid. at 14-15 (concluding that “most peopl e would resist the conclusion that those who have 
expensive tastes are, fore that reason, entitled to a larger share than others”) and 31 (explaining that 
an interpretation of equality of welfare based on each individual’s rel ative success in achieving life 
goals implied distributing much less to those with limited ambitions and much more to those with 
“almost impossible goals”). This objection appears to be based on a similar objection to welfare-
based conceptions of distributive justice in John Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Amartya 
Sen and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982) at 168-69. 
36 Ibid. at 48 and 55. Although Dworkin’s objection in this passage is limited to compensation for 
“deliberately cultivated expensive tastes”, Dworkin maintains that equality of resources would deny 
compensation for all expensive tastes and ambitions (except “cravings so severe and disabling as to 
fall under the category of mental disease”) on the grounds that the pursuit of one’s tastes and 
ambitions  is ultimately a matter of choice for which individuals should be held responsible, rather 
than a consequence of their circumstances for which compensation is due. Ibid. at 82-83. For a 
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 Finally, and more generally, Dworkin argues that the concept of “welfare” is 
itself is so abstract and ambiguous that it is impossible to assess its merits for a 
theory of distributive justice until “a particular understanding or conception of 
welfare is specified” – at which point the ideal invariably loses “whatever appeal it 
might have had.”37 
 
If “welfare” is understood in classical utilitarian fashion as an excess of 
pleasure over pain or more broadly as “enjoyment” over “dissatisfaction”,38 for 
example, an obvious objection to the concept is that people differ in the extent to 
which they regard pleasure or enjoyment as essential to a good or successful life.39 
On the contrary, Dworkin maintains: 
 
most of us … are dedicated to something whose value to us is not exhausted or 
captured in the enjoyment its realization will bring, and some are dedicated to 
more things in that way, or more strongly dedicated, than others. Even when 
we do enjoy what we have or have done, we often enjoy it because we think it 
valuable, not vice versa. And we sometimes choose … a life that we believe will 
bring less enjoyment because it is in other ways a better life to lead.40 
 
For this reason, what Dworkin calls “conscious-state” theories of welfare do not 
correspond to the standards by which most people govern their own lives, making it 
a questionable metric for a conception of equality and a theory of distributive 
justice.41 
                                                                                                                                                 
critical response to this conclusion, see G.A. Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice” (1989), 
99 Ethics 906-944 at 916-934, arguing that the problem of expensive tastes is less a matter of 
individual choice than a consequence of market supply and demand that render one’s tastes 
expensive, so that the problem of involuntary expensive tastes also a matter of “brute back luck” for 
which an egalitarian conception of distributive justice should provide compensation. See also G.A. 
Cohen, “Expensive Taste Rides Again” in Justine Burley, ed., Dworkin and His Critics, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004) 3-39, and Dworkin’s response to Cohen, see Ronald Dworkin, 
“Ronald Dworkin Replies” in ibid., 339-95 at 339-50. For the purpose of this article, it is not necessary 
to address this debate, since the argument against welfare as a metric of distributional equality is 
effectively made on the basis of deliberately cultivated expensive tastes, on which Cohen and 
Dworkin agree. 
37 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 285; and Dworkin, “Ronald Dworkin Replies” supra 
note 36 at 340. 
38 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 18, explaining that these terms encompass “the full 
range of desirable and undesirable conscious states or emotions that any version of a conscious -state 
conception of equality of welfare might suppose to matter.”  
39 Ibid. at 42-43, noting that “peopl e differ in the importance each attaches to enjoyment” and that 
“almost no one pursues only enjoyment or will make any l arge sacrifice of anything else he values to 
avoid a small amount of pain.” See also Dworkin, “Ronald Dworkin Replies” supra note 36 at 340: 
“Very few people think that pleasure is all that matters in an overall worthwhile or successful life, 
and even those who think pleasure matters to some important degree disagree about that degree.”  
40 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 43. 
41 Ibid. at 44, concluding that a conception of equality based on pleasure or enjoyment is “an 
unattractive theory in a society in which many if not most peopl e reject that conception, and some 
reject it as alien to their most profound beliefs about the goodness of their own lives.” 
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 Alternatively, if “welfare” is understood more plausibly as a matter of a 
person’s “success in fulfilling his [or her] preferences, goals, and ambitions,”42 it is 
vulnerable to another objection – regardless of whether the concept of “success” is 
understood by reference to the preferences, goals and ambitions that people set for 
themselves (“relative success”) or by reference to more general judgments that 
people make regarding the value of their lives (“overall success”).43 Since reasonable 
people necessarily define their preferences, goals and ambitions and assess the 
value of their lives “against a background of assumptions about the rough type and 
quantity of resources they will have available with which to lead different sorts of 
lives,”44 a theory of distributive justice must first determine the resources to which 
people are entitled before it can properly assess either their relative success in 
achieving their preferences, goals or ambitions or their overall success in leading a 
valuable life.45 For this reason, Dworkin concludes, success theories of welfare are 
no better than conscious-state theories of welfare as a standard for measuring 
distributional equality and  “cannot be used to justify or constitute a theory of fair 
distribution.”46 
 
 Although critics of Dworkin have sought to reassert welfare as a metric for 
distributive justice,47 these objections fail to articulate a specific meaning of 
welfare,48  and remain vulnerable to Dworkin’s objections that they do not 
correspond to the pluralistic standards by which people lead their lives, do not 
provide an adequate account of equality as a limitation on the recognition of 
individual preferences, and do not adequately recognize the role of individual 
responsibility as a criterion for assessing the justice of distributive outcomes. As the 
following section explains, principles of equality and individual responsibility are at 
the core of Dworkin’s conception of distributive justice, distinguishing his theory 
not only from welfare-based approaches but also from Rawls. 
                                                 
42 Ibid. at 17. See also ibid. at 28, describing this conception of welfare as a “plausible theory of 
philosophical psychology,” which “supposes that people are active agents who distinguish between 
success or failure in making the choices and decisions open to them personally, on the one hand, and 
their overall approval or disapproval of the world in general, on the other, and seek to make their 
own lives as valuabl e as  possible according to their own conception of what makes a life better or 
worse, while recognizing, perhaps, moral constraints on the pursuit of that goal and competing goals 
taken from their impersonal preferences.”   
43 Ibid. at 28-42. 
44 Ibid. at 28. 
45 Ibid. at 29 (identifying a “fatal circle” in any attempt to justify a fair distribution of resources based 
on a theory of welfare premised on relative success); and 39 (stating that “a concept of overall 
success … must include, in i ts description of equality of overall  success, assumptions about what a 
fair distribution would be”).  
46 Ibid. at 39. Although this statement refers specifically to theories of welfare premised on overall 
success, the same criticism also applies to theories of welfare premised on relative success.  
47 See, especially, Richard Arneson, “Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice” (2000), 30 Can. J. Phil. 
497-524, arguing that Dworkin’s critique does not apply “if we adopt an objective account of welfare 
and properly accommodate concerns about individual responsibility.” Ibid. at 497.  
48 See, e.g., ibid. at 501, admitting that “a particular welfare-based theory of justice … is beyond the 
scope of this essay.” 
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B.  Resources, Ethical Individualism, and Distributive Justice 
  
 Having criticized welfare as a standard for measuring distributional equality, 
Dworkin introduces the concept of resources as an alternative criterion for this 
purpose. Unlike welfare, he explains, which reduces all values and preferences to a 
single conception of well-being that may not be universally shared, resources 
constitute the means through which people are able to pursue their own ends – 
making it a more suitable metric for distributional equality in a liberal society which 
generally assumes not only that “people differ, sometimes radically, in their 
opinions about what makes their lives go overall better or worse,” but also that 
“people should govern their lives according to their own convictions on that 
matter.”49 
 
 By resources, Dworkin generally means impersonal marketable resources 
that individuals may privately own and exchange50 – though this is not always clear 
in Dworkin’s work, since he also refers to various “personal qualities” such as 
“strength, talent, character, and ambition” as other “categories of resour ce.”51 
Although these personal qualities enter into his theory of distributive justice, 
however, they do so, as he emphasizes, “in different ways”52 – not as resources that 
are themselves the objects of distribution in accordance with equality of resources, 
but as factors that may (or may not) affect the meaning of an equal distribution.53 As 
a result, Dworkin explains, the problem for his theory of distributive justice is “one 
of determining how far the ownership of independent material resources should be 
affected” by differences in personal qualities.54 
                                                 
49 Dworkin, “Ronald Dworkin Replies” supra note 36 at 340-41.  
50 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 65, stating that equality of resources is “a matter of 
equality in whatever resources are owned privately by individuals .” Although emphasizing (at 65) 
that “[p]rivate ownership is not a singl e, unique relationship between a person and a  material 
resource, but an open-textured relationship many aspects of which must be fixed politically,” 
Dworkin sets these questions aside for the purpose of his argument, assuming (at 65 -66) that “the 
general dimensions of ownership are sufficiently well-understood that the question of what pattern 
of private ownership constitutes  an equal division of private resources can be discussed 
independently of these complications.” 
51 Ibid. at 286,  emphasizing a “crucial distinction within the broad category  of personal qualities … 
between a person’s personality, understood in the broad sense to include his [or her] character, 
convictions, preferences, motives, tastes and ambitions, on the one hand, and his [or her] personal 
resources of health, strength, and talent on the other.” 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. at 80: “Though powers are resources, they should not be considered resources whose 
ownership is to be determined … in accordance with some interpretation of equality of resources. 
They are not, that is, resources for the theory of equality in exactly the sense in which ordinary 
material resources are.” In this respect, Dworkin’s theory differs from that of John Rawls, who 
regards natural talents as “a common asset” the benefits of which are shared with the least well off 
by virtue of his difference principl e. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 101, and 179, 
describing “the distribution of natural abilities as a collective asset” from which  
the more fortunate” may benefit “only in ways that hep those who have lost out.”  
54 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 80. 
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 For this purpose, Dworkin relies on two principles of what he calls “ethical 
individualism”: (1) a principle of “equal importance” that requires any political 
community that exercises dominion over and demands allegiance from its citizens 
to treat them with equal concern; and (2) a principle of “special responsibility” that 
regards individuals as having a particular responsibility for the choices that shape 
their lives.55 While the first principle “requires government to adopt laws and 
policies that insure that its citizen’s fates are, so far as government can achieve this, 
insensitive to who they otherwise are – their economic backgrounds, gender, race, 
or particular sets of skills and handicaps,” the second principle “demands that 
government work, again so far as it can achieve this, to make their fates sensitive to 
the choices that they have made.”56 Together, these principles define a conception of 
distributive justice that distinguishes between a person’s circumstances and their 
choices, making the justice of distributive outcomes as insensitive as possible to 
people’s circumstances and as sensitive as possible to their choices.57 
 
 While the distinction between a person’s circumstances and their choices  is 
not always easy, Dworkin’s approach relies on ordinary ethical judgments that 
normally distinguish between chance and choice in making assignments of 
consequential responsibility,58 and typically regard individuals as responsible for 
their own personalities in the sense that they identify with the various convictions, 
preferences, tastes and ambitions that comprise their personalities and regard the 
decisions that they make as their own choices rather than matters of good or bad 
luck.59 On this basis, Dworkin generally understands a person’s circumstances to 
include factors that are completely beyond a person’s control (such as genetic 
endowments as well as other fortuitous circumstances that Dworkin labels “brute 
luck”60), and a person’s choices to include attributes and actions to which it is 
reasonable to assign individual responsibility (which generally include the various 
elements that comprise a person’s personality, 61 as well as deliberate decisions to 
                                                 
55 Ibid. at 5-6. 
56 Ibid. at 6. 
57 Ibid. at 287, expl aining that - “individuals should be relieved of consequential responsibility for 
those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute bad luck, but not from those that should 
be seen as flowing from their own choices.” 
58 Ibid., observing that: “We distinguish, for a thousand reasons, between what part of our fate is open 
to assignments of responsibility, because it is the upshot of someone’s choice, and what part is 
ineligible for any such assignment because it is the work not of people but of nature or brute luck.” 
59 Ibid. at 290. To the extent that this is not the case, Dworkin maintains, these attributes of one’s 
personality are best regarded as addictions or obsessions “that we wish we did not have, and 
struggle to conquer or dispel.” Ibid. at 293. 
60 Ibid. at 73, defining “brute luck” as “a matter of how risks fall out that are not … deliberate 
gambles”).   
61 Ibid. at 82, explaining that: “The distinction required by equality of resources is the distinction 
between those beliefs and atti tudes that define what a successful life would be like, which the ideal 
assigns to the person, and those features of body or mind or personality which provide means or 
impediments to that success, which the ideal assigns to the person’s circumstances.”  
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assume known risks, which Dworkin calls “option luck”62). As a result, although 
acknowledging that people’s choices are not “causally independent of their culture, 
history and circumstance,”63 nor of unchosen “convictions, ambitions, and tastes 
that influence their choices,”64 Dworkin concludes that concepts of individual choice 
and responsibility are crucial to “a political morality that makes sense in terms of – 
and of – each citizen’s internal practices of moral and ethical criticism, including 
self-criticism.”65 
 
In this respect, equality of resources differs not only from welfarist 
conceptions of distributive justice, but also from the political liberalism of John 
Rawls – whose principles of justice are derived from a hypothetical social contract 
entered into in an “original position of equality” behind a “veil of ignorance” that 
shields the contracting parties not only from knowledge of their “place in society,” 
but also of their “natural assets and abilities” and their “conceptions of  the good” 
and their “special psychological propensities.”66 From this perspective, Rawls argues, 
the attributes and actions that define a person’s choices are regarded as morally 
arbitrary,67 so that agreed upon principles of justice define only “the basic structure 
of society”68 rather than individual entitlements to distributive shares – which 
Rawls conceptualizes not as rights in any foundational sense but instead as 
“legitimate expectations” for “those who, with the prospect of improving their 
condition, have done what the system announces that it will reward.”69 
 
In contrast to this approach, Dworkin emphasizes that his theory of 
distributive justice does not attempt “to insulate political morality from ethical 
assumptions and controversies about the character of a good life,” but seeks its 
support in “the more general ethical values to which it appeals”70 including the 
distinction between a person’s circumstances and their choices. On this basis, he 
explains, equality of resources “defines a relation among citizens that is 
                                                 
62 Ibid. at 73, defining “option luck” as “a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out – 
whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated 
and might have declined.”  
63 Ronald Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited” (2002), 113 Ethics 106 at 107. 
64 Ibid. See also ibid. at 118, at 118, explaining that, although one may not choose one’s “basic 
convictions, tastes, and preferences” one may “choose to act in one way or another given the[se] 
convictions, tastes and preferences.” 
65 Ibid. at 107, adding that: “Equality of resources rejects strict metaphysical determinism. But we all 
reject determinism, all the time, and it is impossible to imagine how we would live if we did not.” 
66 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 12. 
67 Ibid. at 312, arguing not only that “the initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of 
their growth and nurture in early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view,” but also that “the 
effort that a person is willing to make” is also morally arbitrary since “the effort that a person is 
willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him.” 
68 Ibid. at 7. 
69 Ibid. at 103. See also ibid. at 310-315, distinguishing between “legitimate expectations” to “claims” 
that are “defined by publicly recognized rules” and entitlements based on “moral desert”.  
70 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 5. 
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individualized for each” – determining “what they are, as individuals, entitled to 
have” as “a matter of individual right rather than one of group position.” 71 
 
 While one might question the extent to which it is reasonable to attribute any 
particular distributive outcome to good or bad fortune rather than individual 
responsibility, the Rawlsian view that individual choices and actions have no 
normative significance for distributive justice is deeply problematic given the 
ethical distinction between chance and choice that is ordinarily made in 
assignments of consequential responsibility. For this reason, Dworkin’s theory of 
distributive justice constitutes a valuable improvement on Rawls’ difference 
principle, which is insufficiently attentive to individual rights and responsibilities. 
Although classical libertarians have criticized the difference principle on similar 
grounds,72 the following section explains how Dworkin’s emphasis on equality as a 
criterion for distributive differentiates his approach from classical libertarianism.  
 
C.  Equality of Resources: Original Acquisition and Subsequent Redistribution 
 
 While Dworkin’s theory of distributive justice includes a principle of 
individual responsibility for the consequences of one’s choices, it also affirms a 
conception of equality in the distribution of resources. In order to reconcile these 
two values, which are often seen as mutually inconsistent, Dworkin relies on the 
idea of “an economic market of some form” as both “an analytical device” and “an 
actual political institution.”73 Although Dworkin notes that the market is often 
regarded as “the enemy of equality” and “a necessary condition of individual 
liberty,”74 equality of resources is designed to make the market serve both 
objectives by requiring that people enter the market “on equal terms.”75 In this 
respect, Dworkin’s approach differs sharply from classical libertarianism. 
 
 For classical libertarianism, the justice of any distribution in the ownership 
of property depends not on a “patterned” or “end result” principle such as utility or 
the difference principle, but instead on the justice of its initial acquisition and the 
justice of its subsequent transfer.76 According to John Locke, for example,77 even if 
all resources were originally held “in common,”78 individuals could legitimately 
appropriate these resources without any express agreement based on a right to self-
preservation and entitlement to the fruits of one’s labour79 – subject to a prohibition 
                                                 
71 Ibid. at 114-15. 
72 Nozick, supra note 13.  
73 Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 66. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. at 70. 
76 Nozick, supra note 13 at 149-231. 
77 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690), ed. by C.B. Macpherson (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1980) at 18-24 [chap. V]. For a more detailed account, see, “Private 
Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World” supra note 18 at 24-28.  
78 Ibid. at 18 [chap. V, para. 25]. 
79 Ibid. at 19 [chap. V, paras. 26-28]. 
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against the appropriation of resources that spoil before they are used which is 
overcome through the development of money,80 and a requirement that “enough, 
and as good” is “left in common for others” which is effectively satisfied by the 
productivity of private property. 81  Similarly, Robert Nozick concludes that 
individuals may acquire ownership of originally “unheld things” so long as private 
appropriation satisfies a “Lockean proviso” that others are not made worse off – 
which is fulfilled by the increased social output and varied employment 
opportunities that private property creates.82 In each case, these theories presume 
that the property rights so acquired include the right to transfer property through 
exchange or bequest.83 
 
In contrast to classical libertarianism, Dworkin’s concept of original 
acquisition imagines a division of a society’s resources through an auction or other 
market procedure among members of the society who are assumed to enter into 
this procedure on equal terms.84 Through this arrangement, each individual would 
acquire a bundle of resources based on his or her willingness to pay for these 
resources compared to the willingness to pay of other individuals – making this 
opportunity cost the measure of the resources that each individual could justly 
acquire.85 Although individuals wanting to acquire relatively expensive resources 
might regret that these are not less costly, they could not reasonably complain that 
they have been treated unfairly because the cost of the resources that they choose to 
acquire would reflect their opportunity cost to society as a whole.86 In the end, 
                                                 
80 Ibid. at 20-21 and 28 [chap. V, paras. 31-32 and 46-47]. 
81 Ibid. at 19, 21-22, and 23-24 [chap. V, paras. 27, 33-34, and 37]. 
82 Nozick, supra note 13 at 175-181. 
83 See, e.g., Locke, supra note 77 at 39 [chap. VI, para. 72}, referring to “the power men generally have 
to bestow their estates  on those who please them best”; and Nozick, supra note 13 at 178, referring to 
“a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing.”  
84 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 66-71, employing the analogy of shipwrecked 
survivors who are washed up on an island with no indigenous population and abundant natural 
resources, which they seek to divide equally by allocating an equal number of clamshells to all 
survivors who can exchange these clamshells for the available resources.  Although Dworkin’s 
example assumes that all of the society’s resources are subject to private app ropriation (see ibid. at 
67, noting that the survivors “do not yet realize … that it might be wise to keep some resources as 
owned in common by any state they might create”), his theory does not exclude the possibility that 
some resources might also be held in common. As a result, the theory addresses the only the 
distribution of privately-owned resources, not the division of resources between public and private 
ownership. 
85 Ibid. at 70, concluding that equality of resources requires people to “decide what sorts of lives to 
pursue against a background of information about the actual cost their choices impose on other 
peopl e and hence on the total stock of resources that may fairly be used by them,” and emphasizing 
that “the true measure of the social resourc es devoted to the life of one person is fixed by asking how 
important, in fact, that resource is for others.” 
86 Ibid. at 69, arguing that “luck plays a certain role in determining how satisfied anyone is with the 
outcome – against other possibilities he [or she] might envision,” but that no one “could … complain 
that the division of the actual resources … was unequal.” In this respect, Dworkin explains: “the 
contingent facts of raw material and the distribution of tastes are not grounds on which someone 
might challenge a distribution as unequal. They are rather background facts that determine what 
equality of resources in these circumstances is.”  
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Dworkin concludes, no one would prefer anyone else’s bundle of resources to their 
own,87 and an equal division of the society’s resources – “equality of resources” – 
would prevail.88 
 
Once a society’s resources have been divided in this manner, of course, 
people would continue to transfer and exchange resources and would also produce 
more resources – making different decisions about work and leisure, consumption 
and savings, gifts and bequests, the development of skills and talents, and the 
riskiness of investments; obtaining different rates of return from different market 
activities; and accumulating different resources over time from those originally 
acquired.89 Although a “starting-gate theory” of equality would permit subsequent 
inequalities without any adjustment on the basis that it would be unjust to interfere 
with the property rights acquired through original acquisition, Dworkin rejects this 
conclusion on the grounds that equality is no less relevant to the justification of 
subsequent holdings than it is for the justification of initial holdings,90 so that any 
system of property rights established through an equal division of a society’s 
resources should be subject to subsequent adjustment in the name of equality.91 
Having outlined a basic conception of equality of resources for the purpose of 
original acquisition, therefore, Dworkin must extend the idea to contemplate a 
“dynamic economy” with production, savings and investment.92 
 
In order to do so, Dworkin begins by returning to the concept of ethical 
individualism on which his theory of distributive justice ultimately rests – arguing 
that a dynamic conception of equality of resources must allow distributive outcomes 
to vary with people’s deliberate choices, while simultaneously protecting them as 
much as possible against adverse distributional consequences attributable to brute 
luck.93 As a result, he explains, equality of resources is not violated if a person 
obtains more or less resources than others by choosing to work more or less or in 
                                                 
87 Ibid. at 67, expl aining that “once the division is complete” no individual “would prefer someone 
else’s bundle of resources to his [or her] own.” 
88 Ibid., equating the idea of an equal division of resources with the an “envy test” requiring that no 
one would prefer someone else’s bundle of resources to their own. 
89 Ibid. at 73, noting that the equality of resources achieved through an original division of a society’s 
resources holds “only for the moment, because if they are l eft alone, once the auction is completed, to 
produce and trade as they wish, then the envy test will shortly fail.” 
90 Ibid. at 87-88, arguing that: “Equality can have no greater force in justifying initial equal holdings … 
– against the competing view that all property should be availabl e for Lockean acquisition at that 
time – than later in justifying redistributions when weal th becomes unequal because peopl e’s 
productive talents are different.” 
91 Ibid. at 88, emphasizing that if a system of property rights making “any acquisition subject to 
schemes of redistribution l ater … is chosen at the outset, then no one can later complain that 
redistribution is rules out by … property rights alone.” 
92 Ibid. at 71. 
93 Ibid. at 89, arguing that “we must, on pain of violating equality, allow the distribution of resources 
at any particular moment to be … ambition-sensitive” (refl ecting “the cost or benefit to others of the 
choices people make”), but not “endowment-sensitive” (reflecting “differences in ability of the sort 
that produce income differences in a laissez-faire economy among people with the same ambitions”).  
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occupations that pay more or less,94 by deliberately taking or not taking risks,95 by 
winning or losing intentional gambles,96 or by saving rather than spending.97 Where 
people’s chances to obtain resources are not equally distributed, however, because 
natural talents differ, 98  inheritances vary,99  and opportunities to take risks 
diverge,100 equality of resources demands that any resulting inequalities be offset.101 
Since it is impossible to eliminate all inequalities attributable to brute luck, however, 
Dworkin must devise another method to ensure that equality of resources continues 
to apply over time. 
 
For this purpose, Dworkin draws on the basic conception of equality of 
resources for an equal division of a society’s resources – imagining a market 
mechanism that all members of society would have been willing to enter into on 
equal terms in order to offset the effects of brute luck on distributive outcomes. In 
this respect, Dworkin explains, equality of resources aims to achieve a condition of 
equality ex ante rather than ex post102 – making people “equal, so far as this is 
possible, in the resources with which they face uncertainty”103 as opposed to the 
resources they possess “after the uncertainties of risk” have transpired.104 
                                                 
94 Ibid. at 85, concluding that: “The choice should be indifferent under equality of resources, so long 
as no one envies the total package of work plus consumption” that each person chooses.  
95 Ibid. at 74, explaining that: “Some people enjoy, while others hate, risks; but this particular 
difference in personality is comprehended in a more general difference between the kinds of lives 
that different people wish to lead…. We have already decided that people should pay the price of the 
life that they have decided to lead, measured in what others give up in order that they can do so. That 
was the point of the auction as a device to establish initial equality of resources. But the price of a 
safe life, measured in this way, is precisely foregoing any chance of the gains whose prospect induces 
others to gamble. So we have no reason to object, against the background of our earlier decisions, to a 
result in which those who decline to gamble have less than some of those who do not. 
96 Ibid. at 74-75, emphasizing that “the effect of redistribution from winners to losers in gambles 
would be to deprive both of the lives they prefer.” 
97 Ibid. at 479, note 8, arguing that: “Someone’s decision to spend rather than save what he has 
earned is precisely the kind of decision whose impact should be determined by the market 
uncorrected for tax under this analysis.” 
98 Ibid. at 91, distinguishing between “the effects of differential talents” and “the consequences of … 
choosing an occupation” in response to one’s sense of what one wants to do with one’s life.  
99 Ibid. at 347, observing that “the situation and properties of one’s parents or relatives are as much a 
matter of luck … as one’s own physical powers.” 
100 Ibid. at 76, noting that “the argument in favor of allowing differences in option luck to affect 
income and wealth assumes that everyone has in principle the same gambles available to him [or 
her].” 
101 See, e.g., ibid. at 91, referring to “a scheme of redistribution, so far as we are able, that will 
neutralize the effects of differential talents”. 
102 Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 120-22. 
103 Ibid. at 107. 
104 Ibid. at 121. See also Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 81, explaining in the context of 
mental and physical disabilities that his approach “does not right the balance – nothing can – i t seeks 
to remedy one aspect of the resulting unfairness”; and at 104, noting in the context of individuals 
with skills and talents that command low economic returns that his approach “aims to put such 
peopl e in the position they would have been in had the risk of their fate been subjectively equally 
shared. But it does not make them as well-off in the end as those whose talents are in more demand, 
or as those with similar talents lucky enough to find more profi table employment.”  Al though 
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According to Dworkin, this market mechanism is best represented by a 
hypothetical insurance arrangement in which individuals who are presumed not to 
know the economic returns that their skills and talents will command (and are 
therefore equally-situated in this respect) would purchase insurance against the 
risk of low returns,105 and individuals who are presumed not to know what if any 
inheritance they might receive would purchase insurance against the risk of “bad 
inheritance luck”.106  Although recognizing that the type and level of insurance that 
individuals would acquire in this hypothetical arrangement is somewhat 
“speculative”,107 Dworkin identifies four features that are broadly consistent with 
those of actual insurance markets. 
 
First, since the administration of any insurance arrangement is not costless 
and the costs of insurance benefits and insurance administration must be funded 
from premiums that reduce the resources available to those paying these premiums, 
it is reasonable to assume that coverage would extend only to relatively substantial 
and low probability risks for which the expected welfare losses exceed the welfare 
losses attributable to the payment of relatively small but certain premiums.108 For 
this reason, Dworkin explains, “the lower the income level chosen as the covered 
risk, the better the argument becomes that most people given the chance to buy 
insurance on equal terms would in fact buy at that level.”109 Although Dworkin does 
not specify precisely what this income level might be, he suggests that “[t]he 
argument becomes compelling … well above the level of income presently used to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dworkin’s approach is designed to provide ex post compensation based on a presumed state of ex 
ante equality, equality of resources might also enhance actual equality ex ante, for exampl e through 
educational programs designed to minimize the effects of natural talents and class backgrounds on 
economic opportunities. Dworkin appears to contemplate this kind of ex ante approach to equality of 
resources, suggesting that “an egalitarian society ought, just in the name of equality, to devote special 
resources to training those whose talents, as things fall out, place them lower on the income scal e,” 
but does not address this issue in any detail on the basis that this “is part of the l arger question of an 
egalitarian theory of education, which I have not even attempted to take up here.” Ibid. at 108. 
105 Ibid. at 73-109, explaining (at 94) that the hypothetical insurance arrangement need not assume 
that “people are wholly ignorant of what talents they have, but rather, that for some other reason 
they do not have any sound basis for predicting … what income the talents they do have can produce, 
or even whether the economic situation will be such that these talents will find any employment.” See 
also ibid. at 77, suggesting that “the idea of a market in insurance provides a counterfactual guide” 
through which equality of resources might address income disparities attributable to mental and 
physical disabilities. 
106 Ibid. at 347. 
107 Ibid. at 79. 
108 Ibid. at 97-98, emphasizing that in “the normal case of insurance, … people incur a small certain 
loss to prevent an unlikely grate loss whose marginal utility costs are serious enough to justify a 
financially disadvantageous transaction.” Although Dworkin’s analysis on this point draws on the 
notion of welfare and the principle of diminishing marginal utility, it does so in a very different way 
than welfare-based conceptions of distributive justice – as an account of the kinds of insurance that 
equally-situated individuals would acquire rather than an independent measure of the justice of 
distributive outcomes. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between ins urance and 
utility in Dworkin’s theory, see Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 129-36.   
109 Ibid. at 97. 
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trigger transfer payments for unemployment or minimum wage levels in either 
Britain or the United States.”110 
 
Second, since individuals are much less likely to insure against losses for 
which they are personally responsible than losses for which they are not 
responsible (and insurers are reluctant to insure losses for which individuals are 
personally responsible given the problem of “moral hazard” whereby the availability 
of insurance encourages more and larger claims), the kinds of risks that this 
hypothetical insurance arrangement would be expected to cover are those that are 
attributable primarily to the brute luck that determines a person’s circumstances 
rather than the attributes and actions that define their choices (including the 
deliberate assumption of known risks). For this reason, Dworkin suggests, a 
dynamic conception of equality of resources would provide health and income 
insurance for individuals who experience an illness or disability for which they are 
not responsible and against which they could not insure, but not for illnesses and 
disabilities that are primarily attributable to their own actions or against which they 
could have insured if insurance were available on equal terms.111 For the same 
reason, equality of resources would generally provide insurance for individuals with 
skills and talents that command low economic returns,112 though presumably not 
where these low returns are clearly attributable to an individual’s deliberate 
decision to pursue less remunerative activities.113 In addition, Dworkin maintains, 
equality of resources would not provide insurance against losses resulting from 
                                                 
110 Ibid. For a more detailed examination, see Daniel Markovits, “How Much Redistribution Should 
There Be?” (2003), 112 Yale L.J. 2291 at 2305-2313, concluding that “peopl e would insure only up to 
talent levels that fall significantly – more than 25% – below   the mean.” 
111 Ibid. at 73-74, distinguishing between someone who “develops cancer in the course of a normal 
life” where “there is no particular decision to which we can point as a gamble risking the disease” and 
someone who “smoked cigarettes heavily”; and at 77, arguing that “the bare idea of equality of 
resources, apart from any paternalistic additions, would not argue for redistri bution from the person 
who had insured to the person who had not if, horribly, they were both blinded in the same accident.”  
Although Dworkin is not clear on the rel ationship between paternalistic concerns and equality of 
resources, the reference to “paternalistic additions” in this passage suggests that these 
considerations can be integrated with his idea of equality of resources – for example, by imagining 
what additional insurance an individual might have acquired in a hypothetical position of equality if 
cognizant of the distribution of persons who do and do not purchase accident insurance.  
112 Ibid. at 92-99. 
113 Although Dworkin is not explicit on this point, this conclusion is consistent with his analysis of 
personal tastes more generally – which he attributes to a person’s choices rather than their 
circumstances, notwithstanding that the cost to satisfy thes e tastes is attributable to “the contingent 
facts of raw material and the distribution of tastes.” Ibid. at 69 and 83, concluding that it is “unlikely” 
that individuals would purchase insurance against the risk of costly preferences “except in the case of 
cravings so severe and disabling as to fall under the category of mental disease.”  See also Dworkin, 
“Sovereign Virtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 119, explaining that equality of resources “draws an 
important distinction between people’s physical, material, and economic circumstances, on the one 
hand, and their ambitions and tastes on the other. People are in principl e entitled to compensation, 
measured by a hypothetical insurance calculation, when their resources and opportunities are low in 
virtue of some disadvantage or handicap in the former circumstances, but not when they are low 
because the choices they have made out of the latter properties are expensive measured by the 
opportunity costs to other people of those choices .” 
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risks and gambles that people voluntarily assume,114 though he also suggests that 
“paternalistic reasons” might justify “limiting how much any individual may risk.”115 
In contrast, he argues, equality of resources would provide insurance against the 
risk of receiving little or no inheritance, the prospect of which depends more on the 
luck of one’s birth than one’s own actions.116 
 
Third, because it is often difficult to distinguish between economic outcomes 
for which an individual is primarily responsible and economic outcomes that are 
primarily attributable to brute luck, the coverage that a hypothetical insurance 
arrangement would provide might be expected to include common features of 
standard insurance contracts that are designed to reduce moral hazard – such as co-
insurance that limits the amount of benefits paid to a percentage of a claimant’s 
losses,117 and a requirement that claimants prove their losses.118 Coverage levels 
might also differ based on the extent to which it is possible to differentiate 
categories of claims for which the risk of moral hazard varies – with higher coverage 
for losses for which individuals are less likely to bear any responsibility and lower 
coverage for losses for which individuals are more likely to bear some responsibility.  
  
Finally, and most significantly for the purpose of this article, Dworkin argues 
that the premiums under the hypothetical insurance arrangements that he 
contemplates would likely be measured as “an increasing percentage of the income 
the policy owner turns out to earn” in the case of insurance against the risk of a low 
income,119 and “a steeply progressive rate” in the case of inheritances.120 Since 
insurers would be able to offer a higher level of coverage by charging higher 
premiums, and individuals would have reason to purchase this insurance if it 
increased their expected welfare, the principle of diminishing marginal utility 
suggests that equally-situated individuals who are presumed not to know what they 
would earn or inherit would prefer to buy insurance with premiums that are an 
                                                 
114 Ibid. at 74-75, arguing that “the possibility of loss was … the fair price of the possibility of gain” 
and concluding that “the effect of redistribution from winners to losers in gambl es would be to 
deprive both of lives they prefer.” 
115 Ibid. Although Dworkin does not appear to contemplate the possibility, one way to limit the 
amount that any individual may risk is to provide some kind of compensation in the event of losses – 
presumably on the basis of the same paternalistic considerations that might justify limits on how 
much any individual might risk. As explained earlier, these paternalistic considerations might 
reasonably be integrated with what Dworkin calls “the bare idea of equality of resources” by 
imagining what additional insurance individuals might have acquired in a hypothetical insurance 
market if cognizant of the risks of various losses. Supra note 111. 
116 Ibid. at 346-49. 
117 Ibid. at 101. Other common features might include deductibles that limit benefits to losses 
exceeding a minimum threshold (as is often the case with employment and disability insurance), and 
caps that limit the maximum amount of any benefit. 
118 Ibid. at 101-02, adding that proof of a loss would be “easily provided” at lower levels “by failed 
attempts to find employment or by evidence of less than average general physical and mental 
abilities, and so forth.” 
119 Ibid. at 100. 
120 Ibid. at 348. 
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increasing function of their income or inheritances.121 In each case, therefore, the 
concept of a hypothetical insurance market constitutes the basis for redistributive 
taxes, conceptualized as “premiums” that equally-situated individuals would agree 
to pay. 
 
 Although one might question the emphasis that equality of resources places 
on ex ante equality over ex post outcomes, the extent to which brute luck can be 
distinguished from option luck, and the types of insurance that equally-situated 
individuals might reasonably be expected to purchase in a hypothetical insurance 
market,122 Dworkin’s ideas of original acquisition and subsequent redistribution 
represent compelling alternatives to classical libertarianism, affirming a conception 
of equality as essential to a theory of justice not only for the original acquisition of 
resources but also for their subsequent distribution. The remainder of this article 
considers the implications of Dworkin’s theory for redistributive taxation. 
 
III.  Practice 
 
As a legal and political philosopher, not a tax scholar, it is not surprising that 
Dworkin’s comments on redistributive taxation are limited and basic – emphasizing 
primarily the conceptual rule of these taxes in a society committed to equality of 
resources as “premiums” that equally-situated individuals would have been willing 
to pay to insure against the risks of illness, disability or low market returns, and the 
risk that they might receive little or no inheritance. 
 
The following sections build on Dworkin’s account of redistributive taxation, 
considering the implications of his theory for the kinds of taxes that a society should 
levy in order to promote equality of resources, as well as the design of these taxes. 
The first section considers the form of a personal tax to insure against illness, 
disability and low market returns, and the second examines the design of a tax to 
insure against little or no inheritance. 
 
A.  Personal Taxation 
 
 With respect to personal taxation, tax policy analysts generally contemplate 
three different kinds of taxes, which apply to different tax bases: (1) income taxation, 
which applies to revenue less expenses over a period of time, typically a year, and in 
                                                 
121 Ibid. at 100-101, referring specifically to insurance against a low income. 
122 See, e.g., Michael Otsuka, “Luck, Insurance and Equality” (2002), 113 Ethics 40-54 at 50, arguing 
that Dworkin’s ex ante approach fails to reconcile equality of resources with inequalities that arise ex 
post; and Elizabeth Anderson, “How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?” (2008), 9 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 239-270, arguing that an egalitarian conception of distributive justice 
requires constraints on distributive shares that markets may generate. To the extent that Dworkin’s 
concept of a hypothetical insurance market can incorporate paternalistic considerations and provide 
insurance against the risk of inhabiting a society characterized by extreme inequalities, it may be 
possible to incorporate these concerns within an expanded conception of equality of resources. 
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principle includes all income from labour and capital123; (2) consumption or 
expenditure taxation, which also applies to revenue less expenses over a period of 
time, but excludes all income that is saved during this period rather than spent124; 
and (3) wealth taxation, which generally applies to the aggregate value of a person’s 
assets less liabilities at a particular time such as the end of a taxation year.125  To 
this traditional trio of personal tax bases, tax theorists have also added ability or 
endowment taxation, which would in principle apply to a person’s income-earning 
ability, irrespective of the amount of income that the person actually earns.126 
 
Beginning with income taxation, proponents generally extol the fairness of 
this tax base, which in principle applies comprehensively to all categories of income, 
and is often said to provide the most equitable measure of each person’s “ability to 
pay” tax.127 Although many arguments for the taxation of personal income are 
explicitly welfarist, viewing the concepts of income and ability to pay as substitutes 
or surrogates for individual welfare or utility,128 some rely on non-welfarist 
                                                 
123 This description emphasizes the source of the income, which generally corresponds to the concept 
of income in source-based income tax regimes like those in Canada and the United Kingdom. In 
contrast to this source concept of income, much U.S. tax policy analysis refers to the comprehensive 
concept of income proposed by Henry Simons, which defines income in terms of its uses for 
consumption or saving. Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: Th e Definition of Income as a 
Problem of Fiscal Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) at 50. 
124 This description applies to a cash-flow personal consumption tax in which tax is paid when 
income is spent on consumption rather than saved. See, e.g., Wi lliam D. Andrews, “A Consumption 
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax” (1974), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113; and Nicholas Kaldor, An 
Expenditure Tax, (London: Routledge, 1955). Alternatively, a yield-exemption consumption tax would 
exempt all capital income from tax, making this form of consumption tax equivalent to a so-called 
wage tax that would apply exclusively to l abour income. See, e.g. David Bradford, Untangling the 
Income Tax, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 89-94. Although these authors 
generally assume that the yield-exemption approach is equivalent to the cash-flow approach, this 
equivalence holds only if several assumptions apply, including that investment returns  are certain, 
taxpayers can borrow and l end unlimited amounts  at a risk-free rate, and that tax rates are not 
progressive and remain constant over time – assumptions that are unlikely to be satisfied in practice. 
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, “Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax” (1979), 82 Harv. L. Rev. 
1575 at 1602.  
125 See, e.g., C.T. Sandford, J.R.M. Willis and D.J. Ironside, An Annual Wealth Tax, (London: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1975); and David Shakow and Reed Shuldiner, “A Comprehensive Wealth Tax” 
(2000), 53 Tax L. Rev. 499. 
126 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, “Taxing Endowment” (2006), 55 Duke L.J. 1145 at 1145, explaining 
that the idea was proposed by the first president of the American Economic Association in 1888, who 
argued that “a facul ty tax consti tutes the only theoretically just form of taxation, men being required 
to serve the state in the degree in which they have ability to serve themselves.” Francis A. Walker, 
“The Bases of Taxation” (1888), 3 Pol. Sci. Q. 1 at 15. Al though it is widely recognized that a tax on 
earning ability would be impossible to administer, ability or endowment might nonetheless be 
regarded as an ideal to which an actual tax system should aspire in various ways.  
127 See, e.g., Alan Gunn, “The Case for an Income Tax” (1979), 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 370. 
128  See, e.g., Richard Goode, “The Economic Definition of Income” in Joseph A. Pechman, 
Comprehensive Income Taxation, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977) 1 at 9, arguing 
that “the income tax is superior in principle to the expenditure tax … because income is generally a 
better index of ability to pay than is consumption”; and Robert Murray Haig, “T he Concept of Income 
– Economic and Legal Aspects,” in R.M. Haig, The Federal Income Tax, (New York: Columbia 
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conceptions of distributive justice which regard personal income taxation as the 
legitimate assertion of a social claim to a share of all output based on “the role of 
fortuity in income distribution and the dependence of producers on consumers and 
other producers to create value in our society.”129 The latter rationale is obviously 
more compatible with equality of resources than the former. 
 
 For those favouring personal consumption or expenditure taxation, on the 
other hand, tax fairness is best measured by reference to the resources that one 
consumes during a taxable period, rather than the income that one earns during any 
period (which may be spent on current consumption or saved in order to finance 
future consumption) – on the grounds either that individual welfare ultimately 
depends on personal consumption rather than income,130 or that judgements about 
legitimate distributive shares properly concern the resources that one withdraws 
from society through personal consumption rather than the resources to which one 
is entitled by virtue of one’s labour and investment. 131 Consumption tax advocates 
also challenge the fairness of the income tax, arguing that it discriminates against 
persons who choose to save rather than spend132 – differentiating between 
individuals who are equally situated ex ante based solely on their preference for 
future consumption over current consumption,133 and imposing a “double tax” on 
saving by taxing the returns that compensate savers for deferred consumption.134 
On these grounds, proponents argue, a personal consumption or expenditure tax is 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1921) 27 at 55, defining income as “a flow of satisfactions or intangible 
psychological experiences.”  
129 Alvin Warren, “Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?” (1980), 89 Yale L.J. 
1081 at 1091, citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 72-74, 100-108 and 310-15. See also 
Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., “Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax” (1981), 16 Geo. L. Rev. 1. A similar 
understanding appears to play a role in Henry Simon’s view of the personal income tax, which he 
regards “as a means of mitigating economic inequality” and defines “largely in the light of 
considerations of justice” including the absence of “any justification for prevailing inequality in terms 
of personal desert.” Simons, supra note 123 at 18 and 41. 
130 See, e.g., Irving Fisher, The Nature of Capital and Income, (London: Macmillan, 1906). 
131 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, “The Uneasy Case fo r Capital Taxation” in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. 
Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds., Taxation, Economic Prosperity, and Distributive Justice , (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 166 at 167 and 168, arguing that “the moment of spending … is 
the right time to make social judgments over the appropriate l evel of taxation” and that “our ordinary 
and refl ective moral intuitions ought to consistently run out to the uses of material resources, and not 
to their sources.” For a much earlier version of this argument, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan  (1651), 
ed. By C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1985) at 386-87, arguing that “the equality of 
imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the 
persons that consume the same.” 
132 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Simpler, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) at 35, arguing that: “The very concept of an income tax is 
biased against saving and in favour of spending.”  
133 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 124 at 315; and Fischer, supra note 130 at 249-53.  
134 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 124 at 1167, arguing that an income tax “imposes an excessive 
burden on deferred consumption”; and McCaffery, Fair Not Flat, supra note 132 at 36, arguing that an 
income tax imposes a “second tax on savings.” See also J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Books 
IV and V (1848), (New York: Penguin Classics, 1985), ch. 2 at 162-69. 
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both fairer and more efficient than a personal income tax.135 As with the taxation of 
personal income, therefore, arguments for personal consumption or expenditure 
taxation invoke both welfarist and non-welfarist conceptions of distributive justice. 
 
 This is also the case with arguments for personal wealth taxation and ability 
or endowment taxation. The former, for example, is defended both on the welfarist 
grounds that wealth confers a form of ability to pay that is not recognized in most 
measures of income or consumption,136 and on the non-welfarist basis that wealth 
taxation can curb extreme concentrations of wealth which can threaten democratic 
institutions, social stability and economic growth and prosperity.137 The latter is 
similarly supported on the welfarist basis that earning ability corresponds more 
closely to individual welfare than income, consumption or wealth,138 and the non-
welfarist basis that earning ability is a better measure of unjustified economic 
inequality than proxies such as income, consumption or wealth – which reflect the 
combined effect of one’s ability or endowment and one’s choices regarding work or 
leisure and savings or consumption.139 
 
 With its emphasis on ex ante equality and its reliance on a principle of ethical 
individualism that distinguishes a person’s choices from their circumstances , one 
might have expected that equality of resources would regard a consumption or 
expenditure tax or an ability or endowment tax as the ideal tax base for personal 
taxation. Indeed, Dworkin’s conclusion that equality of resources is not violated if a 
person obtains more or less resources than others by deliberately taking or not 
taking risks, by winning or losing intentional gambles, or by saving rather than 
spending,140 would appear to support consumption or expenditure taxation as an 
                                                 
135 See, e.g., Bankman and Weisbach, supra note 6. 
136 See, e.g., Richard M. Bird, “The Case for Taxing Personal Weal th,” in Report of the Proceedings of 
the Twenty-Third Tax Conference, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1972) 6 at 8, arguing that 
personal wealth affords advantages of “opportunity, flexibility and securi ty” beyond the income that 
it may generate; and Shakow and Shuldiner, supra note 125, arguing that “substantial income  from 
wealth effectively goes untaxed under the current income tax system” which generally does not apply 
to gains until they are realized and does not apply to so-called “imputed income” from assets that are 
not used to generate a market return. 
137 See, e.g., James R. Repetti, “Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth” (2001), 76 N.Y. L. Rev. 825; and Thomas 
Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014) at 
515-34. 
138 See, e.g., Dan Shaviro, “Endowment and Inequality” in Joseph J. Thorndike and Dennis J. Ventry Jr., 
Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 2002) 123 at 128 -29, 
expl aining that an individual with greater earning ability is better off than a persons with a lower 
earning ability even if the former chooses to work less and earn less income.  See also Zelenak, 
“Taxing Endowment” supra note 126 at 1149-1153, reviewing utilitarian arguments for endowment 
taxation 
139 see, e.g., Shaviro, ”Endowment and Inequality” supra note 138 at 140, arguing that “endowment as 
a tool for measuring inequality … remains closer to bedrock than the proxy standards”; and Zel enak, 
“Taxing Endowment” supra note 126 at 1154-55, reviewing the prima facie liberal-egalitarian case 
for endowment taxation 
140 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 74-75 and 479, note 8. See supra notes 95-97 and 
accompanying text. 
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ideal tax base, while his insistence that equality of resources allows the distribution 
of resources to be “ambition-sensitive” but not “endowment-sensitive”141 seems to 
support ability or endowment taxation as an ideal tax base. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, advocates of each of these tax bases have referred to Dworkin for 
support.142 
 
 In fact, however, Dworkin rejects endowment, consumption and wealth as 
ideal tax bases for redistributive taxation and explicitly endorses the income tax for 
this purpose.143 Regarding endowment, Dworkin objects that talents and ambitions 
are “too closely intertwined” to differentiate for tax purposes,144 and that requiring 
people to pay for their talents would require those with high earning abilities to 
“purchase leisure time or the right to a less productive occupation at the cost of 
other resources” – violating equality of resources by causing those whose skills and 
talents command the highest economic returns to envy those whose earnings 
abilities are less.145 Consumption and wealth, on the other hand, are rejected on the 
grounds that the former would exclude investment returns which are presumed to 
reflect more than “preferences for later consumption,”146 while the latter would 
impose an additional burden on income that a person chooses to save rather than 
spend.147 
 
 Although welfarists are generally sympathetic to the idea of ability or 
endowment taxation on the grounds that it would eliminate tax disincentives to 
work,148 most liberal-egalitarians share Dworkin’s aversion to this tax base on the 
grounds that a tax on earning abilities would force those whose skills and talents 
command the highest economic returns to engage in these pursuits for a period of 
time in order to pay the tax – interfering with their freedom to conduct their lives as 
they choose within a framework of equal justice.149 As others have observed, 
                                                 
141 Ibid. at 89. See supra note 93. 
142 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, “Tax’s Empire” (1996), 85 Georgetown L.J. 71 at 141-141-44, relying 
on Dworkin’s “political-interpretive approach” to support a progressive consumption tax, but not 
referring specifically to Dworkin’s work on equality of resources; and Shaviro, “Endowment and 
Inequality” supra note 138 at 140-42, reviewing liberal-egalitarian arguments for redistributing 
income from high-endowment to low-endowment individuals. 
143 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 90-91 and 478-79, note 8.   
144 Ibid. at 91, observing that” “Talents are nurtured and developed, not discovered full-blown,  and 
peopl e choose which talents to develop in response to their beliefs about what sort of person it is 
best to be.” 
145 Ibid. at 90. 
146 Ibid. at 479, n. 8, assuming that investment income “reflects skill in investment as  well as 
preferences for later consumption.” 
147 Ibid., arguing that a person’s decision “to spend rather than save” is “precisely the kind of decision 
whose impact should be determined by the market uncorrected for tax.”  
148 See, e.g., Walker, supra note 126; and Mirrlees, supra note 4. 
149 See, e.g., John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) at 158, 
rejecting an endowment tax on the basis that it would violate our basic liberties”; Eric Rakowski, 
“Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?” (2000), 53 Tax L. Rev. 263 at 267, n. 10, arguing that “it seems 
wrong to compel somebody to pay taxes on the value of his tal ents – capacities that came to him 
naturally or incidental to some voluntary activity and not by his design – if he chooses not to use 
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however, if liberal-egalitarians consider it acceptable for a tax system to require 
people to work longer hours or in particular occupations in order to obtain 
sufficient after-tax income in order to satisfy their consumption preferences,150 it is 
not clear why it is unacceptable for a tax system to require people to work at least 
some hours in some occupations in order to satisfy the requirements of a 
redistributive tax.151 While an answer may lie in a distinction between market 
returns that are realized though social interaction and potential returns that are not 
realized through market exchanges, this argument requires further elaboration.152 
 
Even if ability or endowment taxation is considered normatively indefensible 
(and administratively infeasible), however, it might be possible to imagine specific 
features of a tax and transfer system that might aim to track Dworkin’s distinction 
between a person’s ambitions and their endowments in ways that are both 
administratively feasible and normatively acceptable.153 Public health insurance, for 
example, arguably redistributes along one dimension of endowment by transferring 
resources from the healthy to the sick,154 as do disability support programs which 
transfer resources from the “able” to the “disabled” . The same may also be said of 
public pension plans, which redistribute resources from “the short-lived to the long-
lived.”155 Others have proposed endowment-related taxes that would vary according 
to average parental income during childhood,156 or Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 
                                                                                                                                                 
them productively” since this “would effectively enslave the able, by forcing them to put their highly 
taxes talents to some lucrative employ, on pain of sitting in a debtors’ prison, however unpalatable 
the person found compensated work”; and Murphy and Nagel, supra note 1 at 122, identifying a 
“moral objection that endowment taxation would effectively force work on those who could 
otherwise survive without wage earnings and likewise force many people who would prefer a lower-
paying position into careers that they have no interest in.” 
150 In this respect, liberal-egalitarians differ from classical libertarians, who – as Nozick argued – 
regard redistributive income taxes as “on a par with forced labor.” Nozick, supra note 13 at 169. 
151 See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, “Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objections to 
Endowment Taxation” (2005), 18 Can. J. L. & Juris. 47 at 49, arguing that “there is no difference in 
kind or in degree between the interference with liberty occasioned by the two types of taxes” – 
“unless one assigns greater moral value to non -market activities than to market activities (a position 
arguably in tension with the liberal principl e of neutrality as between alternative visions of the good 
life”; and Shaviro, “Endowment and Inequality” supra note 138 at 133. As Stark and others emphasize,  
however, this conclusion may not apply if labour markets are “lumpy” so that a particular level of 
income can be obtained only by working full time. Stark, supra note 151 at 59, n. 64; and Shaviro, 
“Endowment and Inequality” supra note 138 at 138-39. 
152 For an argument along these lines, see David M. Hasen, “Liberalism and Ability Taxation” (2007), 
85 Tex. L. Rev. 1057 at 1113, arguing that legi timate redistributive in a liberal society should extend 
only to “resources that would be created in the system of social cooperation”.   
153 See, e.g., Zelenak, “Taxing Endowment” supra note 126 at 1172-1181, examining various schemes 
of “partial endowment taxation”. 
154 See, e.g., Kyle Logue and Ronen Avraham, “Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and 
Insurance” (2003), 56 Tax L. Rev. 157 at 226-27. 
155 Ibid. at 227, n. 211. 
156 Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1999) at 155-77, referring to such a tax as a “privilege tax”. 
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scores achieved in high school157 – though these approaches might well raise the 
same concerns about “talent slavery” that motivate liberal-egalitarian concerns 
about ability or endowment as an ideal tax base. More appealing, perhaps, are tax 
rules that would provide graduated cost recovery for investments in education and 
training, thereby reducing the tax on returns from these investment, on the basis 
that the income derived from the skills and talents acquired through these 
investments is more closely related to ambitions and efforts than endowments and 
circumstances.158 
 
Dworkin’s opposition to consumption or expenditure as an ideal tax base is 
more puzzling given the emphasis that equality of resources places on ex ante 
equality,159 and his conclusion that taxation should not alter the distributive 
consequences of individual decisions to take risks or gambles or to save rather than 
spend160 – arguments that are often used to support the taxation of personal 
consumption or expenditure.161 With respect to risks and gambles, however, 
Dworkin acknowledges that “paternalistic” considerations might affect this 
conclusion, so that a hypothetical insurance market might compensate persons who 
suffer the consequences of bad option luck as well as bad brute luck.162 Indeed, to 
the extent that the gambles involved in most investments entail both known risks 
and unknown risks, these gambles are apt to combine elements of option luck and 
brute luck, justifying at least some ex post redistribution from winners to losers. For 
both reasons, equality of resources might reasonably reject a yield-exemption 
consumption tax as incompatible with distributive justice.163 
                                                 
157 Zelenak, “Taxing Endowment” supra note 126 at 1180,  observing that “if SAT sco res depend on 
some combination of social privilege and genetic endowment, a tax based on SAT scores might come 
closer to a tax on overall endowment than at tax based on social privilege alone.”  
158 See, e.g., David S. Davenport, “Education and Human Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a 
Sensible Tax Policy” (1992), 42 Cas. W. Res. L. Rev. 793. 
159 Supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
160 Supra notes 97-97 and accompanying text.  
161 Supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. 
162 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 75 and 77. See supra notes 111 and 115 and 
accompanying text, suggesting that these paternalistic considerations might be integrated with 
Dworkin’s idea of equality of resources by imagining what additional insurance individuals in  a 
hypothetical position of equality might have purchased if cognizant of the risks of not insuring 
against bad option luck. 
163 For a similar argument against a yield-exemption consumption tax, see Graetz, supra note 124 at 
1600-01, arguing that “lucky gamblers are not the same as unlucky gamblers” and that “the tax base 
must distinguish those who are lucky from those who are unlucky, even though they might have been 
in the same position with respect to their expectations before the gamble.”  This conclusion assumes 
that a tax system can, in fact, apply to returns to risk – which economic analysis demonstrates is not 
the case in a flat-rate income tax with full loss offsets in which investors can borrow at the risk-free 
rate of return in order to increase the size of investments that are subject to taxation in the event of 
success and loss offset in the case of failure. See, e.g., Evsey D. Domar and Richard A. Musgrave, 
“Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taxing” (1944), 58 Q. J. of Econ. 388; Joseph Bankman and 
Thomas Griffith, “Is the Debate Between and Income Tax and a Consumption Tax A Debate About 
Risk? Does it Matter? (1992), 47 Tax L. Rev. 377; and David A. Weisbach, “The (Non)Taxation of Risk” 
(2004), 58 Tax L. Rev. 1. Since the assumptions on which this conclusion rest are unlikely to apply in 
practice, it seems reasonable to conclude that “reports of the death of principles taxation of risk 
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 Since a cash-flow consumption tax would apply on an ex post basis to all 
investment returns that are used for personal consumption, it is not vulnerable to 
this objection to the yield-exemption approach.164 By excluding saved income from 
tax, however, the effect of a cash-flow consumption tax is to exempt the risk-free 
return on invested capital, which is included in the base of an income tax.165 
Although consumption-tax advocates often argue that this risk-free return should be 
exempt from tax on the basis that it merely compensates savers for deferring their 
consumption to a later period,166 others have challenged this theory of the risk-free 
rate of return on the grounds that individuals wanting to smooth their consumption 
over different taxation periods might reasonably save income for this purpose 
without requiring any return167 – suggesting that positive returns on invested 
capital are due entirely to the productivity of capital rather than compensation for 
deferral.168 As well, if the risk-free return on savings should be exempt because it 
compensates for deferred consumption, one might argue that labour income should 
also be exempt on the basis that it compensates workers for giving up leisure 
time.169 
 
 Although Dworkin’s rejection of a personal consumption tax does not 
consider these tax policy arguments for or against personal consumption as an ideal 
tax base, his assumption that investment returns reflect more than “preferences for 
later consumption” is consistent with the tax policy argument that these returns are 
attributable to the productivity of capital and are therefore properly included in the 
base of a redistributive tax. More generally, his support for income as a tax base and 
his view that that the purpose of this tax is to insure against the risk of low market 
returns reflect a clear rejection of the argument by some consumption tax advocates 
that redistributive taxation should address the resources that one withdraws from 
society through personal consumption, rather than the resources that one receives 
                                                                                                                                                 
premium … have been greatly exaggerated.” Lawrence Zel enak, “The Sometimes-Taxation of the 
Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax” (2006), 59 S.M.U. L. Rev. 879 at 915. 
164 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, “A New Understanding of Tax” (2005), 103 Mich. L. Rev. 807 at 812, 
arguing that a “postpaid” or cash-flow personal consumption taxes are fairer than a “prepaid” or 
yield-exemption personal consumption taxes because the former “can and do burden the yield to 
capital.” 
165 For a numerical demonstration of this result, see Warren, supra note 129 at 1102-1107.  
166 See especially Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest as Determined by Impatience to Spend and 
Opportuni ty to Invest It, (New York: Macmillan, 1930). For a helpful review of this “supply-side” 
account of the origin of interest, see Mark Kelman, “Time Preference and Tax Equity” (1983), 35 Stan. 
L. Rev.. 649 at 658-670. 
167 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 129 at 1100, suggesting that a rational consumer might reasonably 
treat consumption in each period equally: “Marooned on a desert island with a lifetime store of  goods, 
a consumer might well allocate an equivalent amount of goods to each of the remaining years of his 
life.”  
168 Ibid. at 1100-1101, suggesting that “the discount observed ex ante is due entirely to the 
productivity of capital, which permits the augmentation of consumption through deferral and 
investment.” See also Kelman, supra note 166 at 670-675, reviewing “demand side” accounts of the 
origin of interest based on the productivity of capital. 
169 Warren, supra note 129 at 1107. 
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through labour and investment.170 On the contrary, as one critic of personal 
consumption taxation has argued: 
 
There is … a sense in which consumption taxation is less consistent with 
individual freedom than is income taxation. The distributive premise of the 
consumption tax is that quantitative consumption decisions are for collective, 
not individual, judgment. It certainly does not seem obvious that this 
premise shows more respect for individual liberty than does the income tax 
view that distribution of product is for collective decision. A persons 
collective responsibilities are concluded at the time of production under the 
income tax; by contrast, under the consumption tax those responsibilities 
are not discharged until a person consumes his [or her] last resource.171 
 
For this reason as well, a redistributive tax based on personal income seems more 
consistent with equality of resources than a redistributive tax aimed at personal 
consumption or expenditure. 
 
 In contrast to personal income, on the other hand, liberal-egalitarians 
generally oppose wealth as an ideal tax base on the grounds that a personal wealth 
tax would impose a tax on income that individuals choose to save rather than 
spend.172 Unlike a personal income tax, which applies to the return from saved 
income, a personal wealth tax would apply to saved income itself – imposing a 
second tax on saved income that would not apply to income that is devoted to 
consumption in the same taxation period. For this reason, Dworkin rejects personal 
wealth as an ideal base for redistributive taxation, concluding that “[s]omeone’s 
decision to spend rather than save … is precisely the kind of decision whose impact 
should be determined by the market uncorrected for tax under this analysis.” 173 
 
Crucially, however, this conclusion depends on the assumption that income is 
subject to redistributive taxation before it is saved or spent, and that inheritances 
are also subject to a system of just redistribution, so that personal wealth is justly 
held.174 To the extent that neither assumption holds, which might be true of an 
income tax that generally does not apply to unrealized gains, equality of resources 
might contemplate a role for personal wealth taxation as a supplement to an income 
tax or a tax on the transfer of wealth. Equality of resources might also contemplate a 
role for personal wealth taxation to reduce extreme concentrations of wealth, on the 
basis that equally-situated individuals participating in a hypothetical insurance 
market might reasonably have insured against a society of extreme inequalities in 
which they might suffer the “distinct harm of occupying a low tier in the class 
                                                 
170 Supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
171 Warren, supra note 129 at 1120-21. 
172 See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 149. 
173 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 479, n. 8. 
174 These assumptions are implicit in Dworkin’s view that equality of resources requires that 
individuals be situated equally ex ante. Although Dworkin notes that he does not consider “the 
problem of later generations” and the role of inheri tance or estate taxes in his analysis of the 
personal tax base, he addresses this issue separately. Ibid. 
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system.”175 In principle, however, Dworkin and other liberal-egalitarians appear to 
regard well-designed income and inheritance taxes as sufficient for this purpose. 
 
 Finally, it is useful to reiterate two important aspects of Dworkin’s proposal 
for a redistributive income tax: that it should be levied at progressive rates, and that 
revenues should be devoted exclusively to benefits paid to those whose skills and 
talents command low market returns. Although Dworkin’s rationale for progressive 
rates relies on a principle of diminishing marginal utility of income, which equally-
situated individuals are assumed to take into account in a hypothetical insurance 
market,176 equality of resources might also favour progressivity on the basis that 
higher market returns are more likely to reflect an element of brute luck than 
ordinary returns – a presumption that is consistent with the phenomenon of 
“winner-take-all” markets in which certain positions offer returns that greatly 
exceed those available to marginally less successful competitors.177 It might also 
contemplate higher rates on speculative gains that are also apt to reflect a 
significant element of brute luck (combined with option luck). 
 
 As for the idea that income tax revenues should be devoted exclusively to 
redistributive transfers, this approach would contradict both traditional public 
finance theory which rejects the idea of dedicated taxes, and prevailing practice in 
most developed countries which adds revenues from income taxes to general tax 
revenues. It might also suggest a more limited role for progressive income taxation 
as part of a tax system in which governments rely more extensively on other taxes 
including sales taxes and benefit-related taxes in order to finance public goods and 
services.178  At the same time, however, dedicating income tax revenues to 
redistributive transfer programs might provide a more compelling rationale for 
progressive income taxation than welfarist rationales based on ability to pay which 
do not adequately account for individual entitlements. 
 
  
                                                 
175 Ibid. at 348, in the context of taxes on estates or inheritances. A personal wealth tax along these 
lines might be consistent with the view that an egalitarian society should place constraints on the 
extent to which markets are allowed to produce extreme inequalities. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 
122. 
176 Ibid. at 100-101. Although Dworkin’s reliance on this principle might seem to suggest that his 
justification for progressive tax rates is ultimately based on individual welfare or utility, Dworkin 
emphasizes that the “the point of the strategy is fairness to individuals” who are presumed in this 
respect to take into account the impact of different income levels on their welfare. Ibid. at 349-50.  
177 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society, (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1995). For an application of the theory to progressive taxation, see Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and 
Alice G. Abreu, “Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation” (1998), 4 Fla. 
Tax Rev. 1. 
178 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns : A simple, Fair and Competitive Plan for 
the United States, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), recommending a reduced role for the 
income tax as an explicitly redistributive tax alongside a broad-based sales or value-added tax; and 
David G. Duff, “Benefi t Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice” (2004), 54 U.T.L.J. 391, 
supporting benefit taxes and user fees as an element of a tax system that includes redistributive taxes.  
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B.  Inheritance Taxation 
 
 In addition to a progressive income tax, Dworkin argues that equality of 
resources would also favour “an inheritance tax, at a steeply progressive rate.”179 
Although fiercely opposed by some commentators on the welfarist grounds that 
taxes on the transfer of wealth allegedly discourage capital accumulation and 
impede economic growth,180 and the non-welfarist basis that these taxes constitute 
a “double tax” on hard-working and thrifty donors who managed to accumulate 
wealth during their lifetimes,181 these taxes are widely supported by liberal-
egalitarians on the grounds that substantial transfers of wealth from one generation 
to another are essentially unearned by their recipients, undermine ideals of fair 
equality of opportunity, and perpetuate dynastic concentrations of wealth that 
undermine social, economic and political equality. 182 According to Rawls, for 
example, progressive gift and inheritance taxes are necessary “not to raise revenue 
… but gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent 
concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair 
equality of opportunity.”183 Dworkin’s argument for a progressive inheritance tax is 
broadly consistent with these concerns, though his emphasis on ethical 
individualism as a principle of distributive justice dictates that his account turns on 
considerations of individual right rather than collective good. 
 
 For Dworkin, the argument for inheritance taxation requires a reconciliation 
between two “competing demands” of equality of resources: (1) that individuals are 
generally free “to spend what is rightfully theirs” after tax as they choose – “on 
expensive cars or art or travel, for example” – without restriction through “further 
                                                 
179 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 348. 
180 See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, “The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation” (1994), 104 Yale L.J. 
283; and David A. Ward, “The Case Against Capital Taxes” (1980) 2 Cdn. Tax’n 31. Notwithstanding 
these claims, empirical evidence suggests that wealth transfer taxes have relatively little impact on 
capital accumulation – a finding that is consistent with theoretical analysis suggesting that the 
motives for transferring wealth are mixed, including accidental bequests on which taxes have no 
impact and altruistic gifts and bequests for which wealth transfer taxes can actually encourage 
increased accumulation in order to maintain a targeted gift or bequest after tax. See, e.g., Wojciech 
Kopczuk and Joel Slemrod, “The Impact of the Estate Tax on Wealth Acc umulation and Avoidance 
Behavior” in William G. Gal e, James B. Hines and Joel Slemrod, eds., Rethinking Estate and Gift 
Taxation, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001) 299; and David Joulfaian, “The Behavioral 
Response of Wealth Accumulation to Estate Taxation: Time Series Evidence” (2006), 59 Nat. Tax J. 
253. For an excellent summary of the literature, see Lily L. Batchelder, “What Should Society Expect 
from Heirs? The Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax” (2009), 63 Tax L. Rev. 1 at 36-38.  
181 See, e.g., Edward McCaffery, “Grave Robbers: The Moral Case Against the Death Tax” (1999), 85 
Tax Notes 1429 at 1436-40. 
182 See, e .g., David G. Duff, “Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument” (1993), 6 Can. J. L. & 
Juris. 3; Eric Rakowski, “Transferring Wealth Liberally” (1996), 51 Tax L. Rev. 419; Anne L. Alstott, 
“Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation” (2007), 121 Harv. L. Rev. 469; and Miranda Perry 
Fleischer, “Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to Combat Dynastic Weal th Transfers” 57 
B.C.L. Rev. 913 (2016). 
183 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 277. 
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taxes”;184 and (2) that “it is unjust when some people lead their lives with less 
wealth available to them, or in otherwise less favorable circumstances, than others, 
not through some choice or gamble of their own but through brute bad luck.”185 
Taking both principles into account, Dworkin rejects the idea that gifts and bequests 
should be prohibited altogether,186 but concludes that “people may be taxed on what 
they give or leave to others because this … form of expenditure … produces injustice 
in the next generation.”187 
 
 In order to fully justify and specify the form of this tax, Dworkin resorts to 
the same device that he employs to justify a progressive income tax, imagining 
“another hypothetical insurance market in which hypothetical people may all buy 
insurance on equal terms.”188 According to Dworkin: 
 
Inheritance insurance would make sense … to guarantee … against the … harm 
of occupying a low tier in a class system – against, that is, a life in a community 
where others have much more money, and consequently more status and 
power, than they do and their children will.189 
 
On this basis, he maintains, equally-situated individuals would insure against “bad 
inheritance luck” – accepting a structure of premiums that would “rise … steeply 
from zero in the case of modest gifts or a modest estate to a very high marginal 
proportion of very great wealth.” 190 In addition, he suggests, since “it falls to income 
taxes” to finance medical benefits and redistributive transfers to individuals whose 
                                                 
184 Dworkin, Sovereign Vi rtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 125; and Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra 
note 20 at 347. Although Dworkin is not clear on this point, the general prohibition against “further 
taxes” that he contemplates presumably would not exclude broad -based sal es or value-added taxes 
or more targeted benefit taxes or user fees that finance public goods and services, nor regulatory 
taxes such as environmental taxes that are deliberately designed to discourage behaviour that 
imposed negative externalities on others. In contrast, equality of resources would appear to exclude 
luxury taxes that might be designed to discourage “conspicuous consumption”.  
185 Ibid. 
186 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue Revisited” supra note 63 at 125. Emphasizing Dworkin’s “envy test” as 
an essential element of his theory, some critics have argued that equality of resources demands 
“extremely strict regulation of gifts and bequests … to ensure that nobody benefits to a greater 
degree from such gifts and bequests than anyone else.” See, e.g., Otsuka, supra note 122 at 52. 
Dworkin’s response seeks a balance between two demands of equality, taking into account the 
position of those who wish to transfer wealth to others gratuitously, as well as the position of those 
in subsequent generations whose opportunities and social position are affected by these transfers. 
For a more detailed effort to balance these competing demands in the design of an inheri tance tax, 
see Duff, “Taxing Inherited Wealth” supra note 182. 
187 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 347. 
188 Ibid. For a critical assessment of Dworkin’s reliance on a hypothetical insurance market for 
inheritance, see Daniel Halliday, “Inheri tance and Hypothetical Insurance” in S. Sciaraffa and w. 
Waluchow, eds., The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 99-114, 
arguing that Dworkin’s commitment to an inheritance tax may also be supported by a commitment to 
independence that justifies a constraint on unrestricted inheritance to prevent class stratification 
and prejudice. 
189 Ibid. at 348. 
190 Ibid. at 347 and 348. 
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skills and talents command low market returns, inheritance tax revenues should be 
used “for improved public education, education and training loans for would -be 
professionals, and other programs that ease the impact of whatever economic 
stratification remains after the tax has been levied.”191 
   
 While Dworkin contemplates that these premiums would be paid by donors, 
in the form of a gift and estate tax that is “measured by the assets given or 
bequeathed,”192 liberal-egalitarians generally favour donee-based taxes that are 
measured by the assets that individuals receive by way of gift or inheritance.193 
Since a donee-based tax would apply tax-exempt thresholds and progressive rates 
to the value of assets received by beneficiaries rather than the value of assets 
accumulated by donors, it is more finely attuned to concerns about unequal 
inheritance than a donor-based tax – imposing the largest tax obligations on the 
most fortunate beneficiaries who receive the largest gifts and inheritances, 
encouraging donors to distribute their wealth more widely, and thereby reducing 
the impact of gifts and inheritances on unequal opportunities and the dynastic 
concentration of wealth.194  For these reasons, a donee-based gift and inheritance 
tax should also be easier to justify as a tax on the fortunate beneficiaries of 
substantial gifts and inheritances, rather than a tax on hard-working and thrifty 
donors, and less vulnerable to the criticism that it constitutes double taxation of 
accumulated wealth on which tax has already been paid.195 
 
 Although Dworkin does not consider these arguments for a donee-based tax 
on the intergenerational transfer of wealth, his justification for a progressive 
inheritance tax is arguably more compatible with gift and inheritance tax levied on 
donees than it is with a gift and estate tax levied on donors – since it seems most 
reasonable to assume that hypothetical individuals would pay for insurance against 
the risk of “bad inheritance luck” with premiums corresponding to the 
manifestation of “good inheritance luck.” Indeed, in a subsequent comment on his 
                                                 
191 Ibid. at 349. 
192 Ibid. at 348.  See also ibid. at 349, arguing that “a s teeply progressive premium would assure them 
[donors] that their own work and success would benefit their children; the only sacrifice they would 
risk, by insuring at a high progressive premium, would be an inability to make their children very 
much richer than their contemporaries.” 
193 See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 2 at 277, suggesting that “the progressive principle 
might be applied at the beneficiary’s end” in order to “encourage the wide dispersal of property 
which is a necessary condition, i t seems, if the fair value of the equal liberties is to be maintained.” In 
principle, such a tax would apply to all gifts and inheri tances received by  indi viduals over the course 
of their lifetimes, in the form of a Lifetime accessions tax. See, e.g., Duff, “Taxing Inherited Wealth” 
supra note 182.; Rakowski, “Transferring Wealth Liberally” supra note 182; and Alstott, “Equal 
Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation” supra note 182. 
194 See, e.g., David G. Duff, “Alternatives to the Gift and Estate Tax” (2016),  57  B.C. L. Rev. 893 at 911-
912. 
195 Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over Taxing Inherited 
Wealth, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 255. 
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inheritance tax proposal, Dworkin appears to accept that this tax should “fall not on 
the donor, … but on the recipient of the gift or bequest.”196 
 
Finally, Dworkin’s argument that inheritance tax revenues should be devoted 
to public education and other programs designed to reduce economic stratification 
seems reasonable given that a central purpose of these taxes to reduce unequal 
opportunities – though one might also imagine other uses such as the payment of a 
“social inheritance” to individuals reaching the age of maturity,197 and is important 
to recognize that additional resources should also be devoted to public education 
and other programs to support advanced education and training on the grounds that 
these programs constitute public services that confer societal benefits in addition to 
those enjoyed by individual recipients. As with Dworkin’s argument for the 
dedication of income tax revenues to redistributive transfers, this approach to the 
use of inheritance tax revenues would contradict traditional public finance theory 
and prevailing practice in most developed countries that levy taxes on transfers of 
wealth, 198 but could help to enhance public understanding and support for 
inheritance taxation as an essential element of a just tax system.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
 While this article does not endorse all aspects of Dworkin’s theory, it argues 
that equality of resources provides a more compelling account of distributive justice 
than welfare-based theories, Rawlsian theory and classical libertarianism – 
combining a conception of economic equality with principles of individual freedom 
and responsibility in a way that affords better recognition to both sets of values than 
these other approaches. On this basis, it examines Dworkin’s arguments for 
redistributive taxation, building on his brief remarks to defend progressive income 
and inheritance taxes for this purpose. 
 
                                                 
196 Dworkin, “Ronald Dworkin Replies” supra note 36 at 353. In a footnote to this comment, Dworkin 
appears to suggest that this approach would include gifts and inheritances as “income” to the donee.  
Ibid., n. 41. See also the brief discussion in Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 117 -118, remarking that “it does seem unprincipled to tax an 
estate at the same rate without regard to the number or wealth of its beneficiaries” and suggesting  
that “it would be much fairer … to treat substantial gifts of any form, including bequests, as income 
subject to ordinary taxes.” Although the income-inclusion approach is one way to tax donees on the 
value of gifts and inheritances, the aggregation of gifts and inheri tances with ordinary income and 
the taxation of these aggregate amounts at income tax rates is arguably inappropriate for the taxation 
of inherited wealth and is incompatible with Dworkin’s argument for a distinct tax on inherited 
wealth. For a critical assessment of the income-inclusion approach to taxing gifts and inheritances, 
see Duff, “Alternatives to the Gift and Estate Tax” supra note 193 at 910-911. 
197 See, e.g., Akerman and Alstott, supra note 156 at 21-64. 
198 Over the past few decades, several countries  have scaled back or repealed taxes on the transfer of 
wealth, which Dworkin suggests “may well be unjust.” Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 20 at 
349. For an account of the repeal of these taxes in several countries, see David G. Duff, “The Abolition 
of Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from Canada, Australia and New Zealand” (2005), 3 Pitt. Tax Rev. 
71. 
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 To the extent that justice is the first virtue of social institutions, it follows 
that a just society should attend to the distributive justice of its tax system as its first 
or sovereign virtue. Relying on Dworkin’s conception of equality of resources as a 
guide, a just tax system would include progressive income and inheritances taxes. 
